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Abstract: We consider the problem of learning about and comparing the
consequences of dynamic treatment strategies on the basis of observational
data. We formulate this within a probabilistic decision-theoretic frame-
work. Our approach is compared with related work by Robins and others:
in particular, we show how Robins’s ‘G-computation’ algorithm arises nat-
urally from this decision-theoretic perspective. Careful attention is paid to
the mathematical and substantive conditions required to justify the use
of this formula. These conditions revolve around a property we term sta-
bility , which relates the probabilistic behaviours of observational and in-
terventional regimes. We show how an assumption of ‘sequential random-
ization’ (or ‘no unmeasured confounders’), or an alternative assumption of
‘sequential irrelevance’, can be used to infer stability. Probabilistic influence
diagrams are used to simplify manipulations, and their power and limita-
tions are discussed. We compare our approach with alternative formulations
based on causal DAGs or potential response models. We aim to show that
formulating the problem of assessing dynamic treatment strategies as a
problem of decision analysis brings clarity, simplicity and generality.
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1. Introduction
Many important practical problems involve sequential decisions, each chosen in
the light of the information available at the time, including in particular the
observed outcomes of earlier decisions. As an example, consider long-term an-
ticoagulation treatment, as often given after events such as stroke, pulmonary
embolism or deep vein thrombosis. The aim is to ensure that the patient’s pro-
thrombin time (INR) is within a target range (which may depend on the diag-
nosis). Patients on this treatment are monitored regularly, and when their INR
is outside the target range the dose of anticoagulant is increased or decreased, so
that the dose at any given time is a function of the previous INR observations.
Despite the availability of limited guidelines for adjusting the dose, the quality
of anticoagulation control achieved is often poor (Rosthøj et al., 2006). Another
example is the question of when to initiate antiretroviral therapy for an HIV-
1-infected patient. The CD4 cell count at which therapy should be started is
a central unresolved issue. Preliminary findings indicate that treatment should
be initiated when the CD4 cell count drops below a certain level, i.e. treatment
should be a function of the patient’s previous CD4 count history (Sterne et al.,
2009).
In general, any well-specified way of adjusting the choice of the next decision
(treatment or dose to administer) in the light of previous information constitutes
a dynamic decision (or treatment) strategy. There will typically be an enormous
number of strategies that could be thought of. Researchers would like to be able
to evaluate and compare these and, ideally, choose a strategy that is optimal
according to a suitable criterion (Murphy, 2003). In many applications, such as
the examples given above, it is unlikely that we will have access to large random
samples of patients treated under each one of the strategies under consideration.
At best, the data available will have been gathered in controlled clinical trials,
but often we will have to content ourselves with data from uncontrolled ob-
servational studies, with, for example, the treatments being selected by doctors
according to informal criteria that we do not know. The key question we address
in the present paper is: Under what conditions, and how, could the available
data be used to evaluate, compare, and hence choose among, the various deci-
sion strategies? When a given strategy can be evaluated from available data it
will be termed identifiable.
In principle, our problem can be formulated, represented and solved using the
machinery of sequential decision theory, including decision trees and influence
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diagrams (Oliver and Smith, 1990; Raiffa, 1968) — and this is indeed the ap-
proach that we shall take in this paper. However, this machinery does not readily
provide us with an answer to the question of when data obtained, for example,
from an observational study will be sufficiently informative to identify a given
strategy. Here, we shall be concerned only with issues around potential biases in
the data, rather than their completeness. Thus wherever necessary we suppose
that the quantity of data available is sufficient to estimate, to any desired preci-
sion, the parameters of the process that actually produced those data. However,
that process might still differ from that in the new decision problem at hand.
We shall therefore propose simple and empirically meaningful conditions (which
can thus be meaningfully criticised) under which it is appropriate and possible
to make use of the available parameter estimates, and we shall develop formulae
for doing this. These conditions will be termed stability due to the way they
relate observational and interventional regimes. We shall further discuss how
one might justify this stability condition by including unobservable variables
into the decision theoretic framework, and by using influence diagrams.
Our proposal is closely related to the seminal work of Robins (Robins, 1986,
1987, 1989, 1997). Much of Robins (1986) takes an essentially decision theoretic
approach, while also using the framework of structured tree graphs as well as
potential responses (and later using causal direct acyclic graphs (DAGs), see
Robins (1997)). He shows that under conditions linking hypothetical studies,
where the different treatment strategies to be compared are applied, identifia-
bility can be achieved. Robins calls these conditions sequential randomization
(and later no unmeasured confounding, see e.g. Robins (1992)). While these are
often formalised using potential responses, a closer inspection of Robins (1986)
(or especially Robins (1997)) reveals that all that is needed is an equality of con-
ditional distributions under different regimes, which is what our stability condi-
tions state explicitly. Furthermore, Robins (1986) introduces the G-computation
algorithm as a method to evaluate a sequential strategy, and contrasts it with
traditional regression approaches that yield biased results even when stability
or sequential randomization holds (Robins, 1992). We shall demonstrate below
that, assuming stability, this G-computation algorithm arises naturally out of
our decision-theoretic analysis, where it can be recognized as a version of the fun-
damental ‘backward induction’ recursion algorithm of dynamic programming.
1.1. Conditional independence
The technical underpinning for our decision-theoretic formulation is the appli-
cation of the language and calculus of conditional independence (Dawid, 1979,
2002) to relate observable variables of two types: ‘random’ variables and ‘deci-
sion’ (or ‘intervention’) variables. This formalism is used to express relationships
that may be assumed between the probabilistic behaviour of random variables
under differing regimes (e.g., observational and interventional). Nevertheless,
although it does greatly clarify and simplify analysis, this particular language
is not indispensable: everything we do could, if so desired, be expressed directly
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in terms of relationships between probability distributions for observable vari-
ables. Thus no essential additional ingredients are being added to the standard
formulation of statistical decision theory.
In many cases the conditional independence relations we work with can be
represented by means of a graphical display: the influence diagram (ID). Once
again, although enormously helpful this is, in a formal sense, only an optional
extra. Moreover, although we pay special attention to problems that can be
represented by influence diagrams, there are yet others, still falling under our
general approach, where this is not possible.
Inessential though these ingredients are, we nevertheless suggest that it is well
worth the effort of mastering the basic language and properties, both algebraic
and graphical, of conditional independence. In particular, these allow very sim-
ple derivations of the logical consequences of assumptions made (Dawid, 1979;
Lauritzen et al., 1990).
1.2. Overview
In §§ 2 and 3 we set out the basic ingredients of our problem and our notation.
Section 4 identifies a simple recursion that can be used to calculate the conse-
quence of applying a given treatment regime when the appropriate probabilistic
ingredients are available. In § 5 we consider how these ingredients might be
come by, and show that the simple stability condition mentioned above allows
estimation of these ingredients — and thus, by application of the procedure ofG-
recursion, of the overall consequence. In §§ 6 and 7 we consider how one might
justify this stability condition, starting from a position (‘extended stability’)
that might sometimes be more defensible, and relate various sets of sufficient
conditions for this to properties of influence diagrams. Section 8 develops more
general conditions, similar to Robins (1987) and Robins (1997), under which
G-recursion can be justified, while § 9 addresses the question of finding an or-
dering of the involved variables suitable to carry out G-recursion. Finally §10
shows how analyses based on the alternative formalism of potential responses
can be related mathematically to our own development.
2. A multistage decision problem
We are concerned with a sequential data-gathering and decision-making process,
progressing through a discrete sequence of stages. The archetypical context is
that of a sequence of medical treatments applied to a patient over time, each
taking into account any interim responses or adverse reactions to earlier treat-
ments, such as the anticoagulation treatment for stroke patients or the decision
of when to start antiretroviral therapy for HIV patients. We shall sometimes
use this language.
Associated with each patient are two sets of variables: L, the set of observable
variables, and A, the set of action variables . The variables in A can, in principle,
be manipulated by external intervention, while those in L are generated and
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revealed by Nature. The variables in L∪A are termed domain variables . There
is a distinguished variable Y ∈ L, the response variable, of special concern.
A specified sequence I := (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , LN+1 ≡ Y ), where Ai ∈ A
and the Li are disjoint subsets of L, defines the information base. The inter-
pretation is that the variables arise or are observed in that order; Li repre-
sents (possibly multivariate, generally time-dependent) patient characteristics
or other variables over which we have no control, observable between times i−1
and i; Ai describes the treatment action applied to the patient at time i; and
Y is the final ‘response variable’ of primary interest.
For simplicity we suppose throughout that all these variables exist and can
be observed for every patient. Thus we do not directly consider cases where,
e.g., Y is time to death, which might occur before some of the L’s and A’s have
had a chance to materialize. However our analyses could readily be elaborated
to handle such extensions.
When the aim is to control Y through appropriate choices for the action
variables (Ai), any principled approach will involve making comparisons, formal
or informal, between the implied distributions of Y under a variety of possible
strategies for choosing the (Ai). For example, we might have specified a loss L(y)
associated with each outcome y of Y , and desire to minimise its expectation
E{L(Y )}.1 Any such decision problem can be solved as soon as we know the
relevant distributions for Y (Dawid, 2000, Section 6).
The simplest kind of strategy is to apply some fixed pre-defined sequence
of actions, irrespective of any observations on the patient: we call this a static
or unconditional strategy (Pearl (2009) terms it atomic). However in realistic
contexts static strategies, which do not take any account of accruing information,
will be of little interest. In particular, under a decision-theoretically optimal
strategy the action to be taken at any stage must typically be chosen to respond
appropriately to the data available at that stage (Murphy, 2003; Robins, 1989).
A non-randomized dynamic treatment strategy (with respect to a given infor-
mation base I) is a rule that determines, for each stage i and each configuration
(or partial history) hi := (l1, a1, . . . , ai−1, li) for the variables (L1, A1, . . . , Ai−1, Li)
available prior to that stage, the value ai of Ai that is then to be applied.
Any decision-theoretically optimal strategy can always be chosen to be non-
randomized. Nevertheless, for added generality we shall also consider random-
ized2 dynamic treatment strategies . Such a strategy determines, for each stage
i and associated partial history hi, a probability distribution for Ai, describing
the random way in which the next action Ai is to be generated. When every
such randomization distribution is degenerate at a single action this reduces to
a non-randomized strategy.
Suppose now we wish to compare a number of such strategies. If we knew or
1 Realistically the loss could also depend on the values of intermediate variables, e.g. if
these relate to adverse drug reactions. Such problems can be treated by redefining Y as the
overall loss suffered (at any rate so long as this loss does not depend on other, unobserved,
variables.)
2More correctly, these correspond to what are termed behavioral rules in decision theory
(Ferguson, 1967)
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could estimate the full probabilistic structure of all the variables under each of
these, we could simply calculate and compare directly the various distributions
for the response Y . As outlined in the introduction, our principal concern in
this paper is how to obtain such distributional knowledge, when in many cases
the only data available will have been gathered under purely observational or
other circumstances that might be very different from the strategies we want to
compare. To clarify the potential difficulties, consider a statistician or scientist S,
who has obtained data on a collection of variables for a large number of patients.
She wishes to use her data, if possible, to identify and compare the consequences
of various treatment interventions or policies that might be contemplated for
some new patient. A major complication, and the motivation for much work in
this area, is that S’s observational data will often be subject to ‘confounding’. For
example, S’s observations may include actions (Ai) that have been determined
by a doctor D, partly on the basis of additional private information D has about
the patient, over and above the variables S has measured. Then knowledge of
the fact that D has selected an act Ai = ai, by virtue of that being correlated
with unobserved private information D has that may also be predictive of the
response Y , could affect the distribution of Y in this observational regime in a
way different from what would occur if D had no such private information, or if S
had herself chosen the value of Ai. In particular, without giving careful thought
to the matter we cannot simply assume that probabilistic behaviour seen under
the observational regime will be directly relevant to other, e.g. interventional,
regimes of interest.
3. Regimes and consequences
In general, we consider the distribution of all the variables in the problem under
a variety of different regimes, possibly but not necessarily involving external
intervention. For example, these might describe different locations, time-periods,
or contexts in which observations can be made. For simplicity we suppose that
the domain variables are the same for all regimes. Formally, we introduce a
regime indicator , σ, taking values in some set S, which specifies which regime is
under consideration — and thus which (known or unknown) joint distribution
over the domain variables L∪A is operating. Thus σ has the logical status of a
parameter or decision variable, rather than a random variable. We think of the
value s of σ as being determined externally, before any observations are made;
all probability statements about the domain variables must then be explicitly
or implicitly conditional on the value of σ. We use e.g. p(y | x ; s) to denote
the conditional density for Y , at y, given X = x, under regime σ = s. In order
to side-step measure-theoretic subtleties, we shall confine attention to the case
that all variables considered are discrete; in particular, the terms ‘distribution’ or
‘density’ should be interpreted as denoting a probability mass function. However,
the basic logic of our arguments does extend to more general cases (albeit with
some non-trivial technical complications to handle null events.)
If we know p(y; s) for all y, we can determine, for any function k(·), the
expectation E{k(Y ); s}. Often we shall be interested in one or a small number
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of such functions, e.g. a loss function k(y) ≡ L(y). For definiteness we henceforth
consider a fixed given function k(Y ), and use the term consequence of s to denote
the expectation E{k(Y ); s} of k(Y ) when regime s is followed.
More generally we might wish to focus attention on a subgroup (typically
defined in terms of the pre-treatment information L1), and compare the various
‘conditional consequences’, given membership of the subgroup. Although we do
not address this directly here, it is straightforward to extend our unconditional
analysis to this case.
3.1. Inference across regimes
In the most usual and useful situation, S = {o} ∪ S∗, where o is a particular
observational regime under which data have been gathered, and S∗ is a collection
of contemplated interventional strategies with respect to the information base
(L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ). We wish to use data collected under the observational
regime o to identify the consequence of following any of the strategies e ∈ S∗.
This means we need to make inference strictly beyond the available data to
what would happen, in future cases, under regimes that we have not been able
to observe in the past.
It should be obvious, but nonetheless deserves emphasis, that we can not
begin to address this problem without assuming some relationships between
the probabilistic behaviour of the variables across the differing regimes, both
observed and unobserved. Inferences across regimes will typically be highly sen-
sitive to the assumptions made, and the validity of our conclusions will depend
on their reasonableness. Although in principle any such assumptions are open to
empirical test, using data gathered under all the regimes involved, this will of-
ten be impossible in practice. In this case, while it is easy to make assumptions,
it can be much harder to justify them. Any justification must involve context-
dependent considerations, which we can not begin to address here. Instead we
simply aim to understand the logical consequences of making certain assump-
tions. One message that could be drawn is: if you don’t like the consequences,
rethink your assumptions.
4. Evaluation of consequences
Writing e.g. (L1, L2) for L1 ∪ L2, we denote (L1, . . . , Li) by Li, with similar
conventions for other variables in the problem.
For any fixed regime s, we can specify the joint distribution of (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ),
when σ = s, in terms of its sequential conditional distributions for each variable,
given all earlier variables. These comprise:
(i). p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s) for i = 1, . . . , N .
(ii). p(ai | li, ai−1 ; s) for i = 1, . . . , N .
(iii). p(y | lN , aN ; s).
Note that (iii) can also be considered as the special case of (i) for i = N + 1.
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With lN+1 ≡ y, we can factorize the overall joint density as:
p(y, l, a ; s) =
{
N+1∏
i=1
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s)
}
×
{
N∏
i=1
p(ai | li, ai−1 ; s)
}
. (1)
If we know all the terms in (1), we can simply sum out over all variables but
lN+1 ≡ y to obtain the desired distribution p(y; s) of Y under regime s, from
which we can in turn compute the consequence E{k(Y ); s}.
Alternatively, and more efficiently, this calculation can be implemented recur-
sively, as follows. Let h denote a partial history, of the form (li, ai−1) or (li, ai)
(0 ≤ i ≤ N). We also include the ‘null’ history ∅, and ‘full’ histories (lN , aN , y).
We denote the set of all partial histories by H. Fixing the regime s, define a
function f on H by:
f(h) := E{k(Y ) | h ; s}. (2)
Simple application of the laws of probability yields:
f(li, ai−1) =
∑
ai
p(ai | li, ai−1 ; s)× f(li, ai) (3)
f(li−1, ai−1) =
∑
li
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s)× f(li, ai−1). (4)
For h a full history (lN , aN , y), we have f(h) = k(y). Using these as starting
values, by successively implementing (3) and (4) in turn, starting with (4) for
i = N + 1 and ending with (4) for i = 1, we step down through ever shorter
histories until we have computed f(∅) = E{k(Y ) ; s}, the consequence of regime
s.3
The recursion expressed by (3) and (4) is exactly that underlying the ‘exten-
sive form’ analysis of sequential decision theory (see e.g. Raiffa (1968)). In par-
ticular, under suitable further conditions we can combine this recursive method
for evaluation of consequences with the selection of an optimal strategy, when it
becomes dynamic programming. This ‘step-down histories’ approach also applies
just as readily to more general probability or decision trees, where the length
of the history, and even the variables entering into it, can vary with the path
followed. We do not consider such extensions here, but they raise no new issues
of principle.
When s is a non-randomized strategy, the distribution of Ai given Li = li,
when σ = s, is degenerate, at ai = gi = gi(li ; s), say, and the only randomness
left is for the variables (L1, . . . , LN , Y ). We can now consider f(h) as a function
of only the (li) appearing in h, since, under s, these then determine the (ai).
Then (3) holds automatically, while (4) becomes:
f(li−1) =
∑
li
p(li | li−1, gi−1; s)× f(li). (5)
3More generally (see footnote 1), we could consider a function Y ∗ of (LN , AN , Y ). Starting
now with f(lN , aN , y) := Y
∗(lN , aN , y), we can apply the identical steps to arrive at f(∅) =
E{Y ∗ ; s}. In particular we can evaluate the expected overall loss under s, even when the loss
function depends on the full sequence of variables.
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When, further, the regime s is static, each gi in the above expressions reduces
to the fixed action a∗i specified by s.
We remark that the conditional distributions in (i)–(iii) and (2) are undefined
when the conditioning event has probability 0 under s. The overall results of
recursive application of (3) and (4) will not depend on how such ambiguities are
resolved. However, for later convenience we henceforth assume that f(h) in (2)
is defined as 0 whenever p(h ; s) = 0. Note that this property is preserved under
(3) and (4).
5. Identifying the ingredients
In order for the statistician S to be able to apply the above recursive method
to calculate the consequence of some contemplated regime s, she needs to know
all the ingredients (i), (ii) and (iii). How might such knowledge be attained?
5.1. Control strategies
Consider first the term p(ai | li, ai−1 ; s) in (ii), as needed for (3). It will often
be the case that for the regimes s of interest this is known a priori to the
statistician S for all i. For instance we might be interested in strategies for
initiating antiretroviral treatment of HIV patients as soon as the CD4 count
has dropped below a given value c. The strategy therefore fully determines the
value of the binary Ai given the previous covariate history li as long as this
includes information on the CD4 counts. In such a case we shall call s a control
strategy (with respect to the information base I = (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y )).
In particular this will typically be the case when s is a (possibly randomized)
dynamic strategy, as introduced in § 2.
5.2. Stability
More problematic is the source of knowledge of the conditional density p(li |
li−1, ai−1 ; s) in (i) as required for (4) (including, as a special case, that of
p(y | lN , aN ; s) in (iii)).
If we observed many instances of regime s, we may be able to estimate this
directly; but typically we will be interested in assessing the consequences of
various contemplated regimes (e.g. control strategies) that we have never yet
observed. The problem then becomes: under what conditions can we use proba-
bility distributions assessed under one regime to deduce the required conditional
probabilities, (i) and (iii), under another?
In the application of most interest, we have S = {o} ∪ S∗, where o is an
observational regime under which data have been gathered, and S∗ is a collection
of contemplated interventional strategies. If we can use data collected under
the observational regime o to identify the consequence of following any of the
strategies e ∈ S∗, we will be in a position to compare the consequences of
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different interventional strategies (and thus, if desired, choose an optimal one)
on the basis of data collected in the single regime o.
In general, the distribution of Li given (Li−1, Ai−1) will depend on which
regime is in operation. Even application of a control strategy might well have
effects on the joint distribution of all the variables, beyond the behaviour it di-
rectly specifies for the actions. For example, consider an educational experiment
in which we can select certain pupils to undergo additional home tutoring. Such
an intervention can not be imposed without subjecting the pupil and his family
to additional procedures and expectations, which would probably be different
if the decision to undergo extra tutoring had come directly from the pupil, and
possibly different again if it had come from the parents. Consequently we can
not necessarily assume that the distribution of Li given (Li−1, Ai−1) assessed
under the observational regime will be the same as that for an interventional
strategy, or that it would be the same for different interventional strategies.
It will clearly be helpful when we can impose this assumption — and so be
able to identify the required interventional distributions of Li given (Li−1, Ai−1)
with those assessed under the observational regime. We formalize this assump-
tion as follows:
Definition 5.1 We say that the problem exhibits simple stability, with respect
to the information base I = (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) and the set S of regimes
if, with σ denoting the non-random regime indicator taking values in S:
Li⊥⊥ σ | (Li−1, Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1). (6)
Here and throughout, we use the notation and theory of conditional inde-
pendence introduced by Dawid (1979), as generalized as in Dawid (2002) to
apply also to problems involving decision or parameter variables. In words, con-
dition (6) asserts that the stochastic way in which Li arises, given the previous
values of the L’s and A’s, should be the same, irrespective of which regime in
S is in operation. More precisely, expressed in terms of densities, (6) requires
that, for each i = 1, . . . , N + 1, there exist some common conditional density
specification q(Li = li | Li−1 = li−1, Ai−1 = ai−1) such that, for each s ∈ S,
p(Li = li | Li−1 = li−1, Ai−1 = ai−1; s) = q(Li = li | Li−1 = li−1, Ai−1 = ai−1)
(7)
whenever the conditioning event has positive probability under regime s.
As will be described further in § 7 below, it is often helpful (though never
essential) to represent conditional independence properties graphically, using
the formalism of influence diagrams (IDs): such diagrams have very specific
semantics, and can facilitate logical arguments by displaying implied properties
in a particularly transparent form (Dawid, 2002). The appropriate graphical
encoding of property (6) for i = 1, 2 and 3 is shown in Figure 1. The specific
property (6) is represented by the absence of arrows from σ to L1, L2, and
Y ≡ L3. For general N we simply supplement the complete directed graph on
(L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) with an additional regime node σ, and an arrow from
σ to each Ai.
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A1L1 A2L2 Y
σ
Fig 1. Influence diagram: stability
5.2.1. Some comments
An important question is how we should assess whether property (6) holds in any
given situation. It could in principle be tested empirically, if we could collect data
under all regimes. In practice this is usually impossible, and other arguments
for or against its appropriateness would be brought to bear. Whether or not the
simple stability property can be regarded as appropriate in any application will
depend on the overall context of the problem. In particular, it will depend on the
specific information base involved. For example, if e is a control strategy with
respect to S’s information base, and o an observational regime under which the
doctor D chooses the (Ai) on the basis of private information not represented in
S’s information base, possibly associated with Li, then, for S = {o, e}, we might
well expect (6) to be violated. This is often described as (potential) confounding.
The simple stability property (6) is our version of a condition termed ‘se-
quential randomization’ (Robins, 1986, 1997) or ‘no unmeasured confounding’
(Robins, 1992; Robins, Herna´n and Brumback, 2000) or ‘sequential ignorability’
(Robins, 2000). The connexions become particularly clear when comparing (6)
with the equalities derived in Theorem 3.1 of Robins (1997), which we consider
in more detail in § 10.1.1 below. These alternative names suggest particular sit-
uations where stability should be satisfied, such as when the data have been
gathered under an observational regime where the actions were indeed phys-
ically sequentially randomized; or when S’s information base contains all the
information the doctor D has used in choosing the (Ai). However, we emphasise
that our property (6) can be meaningfully considered even without referring to
any ‘potential confounder’ variables; and that if (as in § 6 below) we do choose
to introduce such further variables to help us assess whether (6) holds, neverthe-
less the property itself must hold or fail quite independently of which additional
variables (if any) are considered.
In any case, because stability is a property of the relationship between differ-
ent regimes, it can never be empirically established on the basis of data collected
under only one (e.g., observational) regime, nor can it be deduced from proper-
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ties assumed to hold for just one such regime.
5.2.2. Positivity
The purpose of invoking simple stability (with respect to S = {o} ∪ S∗) is to
get a handle on (4) for an unobserved interventional strategy s = e ∈ S∗, using
data obtained in the observational regime o. Intuitively, under simple stability
we can replace p(li | li−1, ai−1; e) by p(li | li−1, ai−1; o), which is estimable from
the observational data. However, some care is needed on account of the positivity
qualification following (7). If, for example, we want to assess the consequence of
a static interventional strategy e, which always applies some pre-specified action
sequence a∗, we clearly will be unable to do so using data from an observational
regime in which the probability of obtaining that particular sequence of actions
is zero. (Pragmatically it may still be difficult to do so if that probability is
non-zero but so small that we are unable to estimate it well from available
observational data. However we ignore that difficulty here, supposing that the
data are sufficiently extensive that we can indeed get good estimates of all
probabilities under o).
In order to avoid this problem, we impose the positivity (absolute continuity)
condition:
Definition 5.2 We say the problem exhibits positivity if, for any e ∈ S∗, the
joint distribution of (LN , AN , Y ) under Pe is absolutely continuous with respect
to that under Po, i.e.
p(E; e) > 0⇒ p(E; o) > 0 (8)
for any event E defined in terms of (LN , AN , Y ). We write this as Pe ≪ Po.
In our discrete set-up, it is clearly enough to demand (8) whenever E comprises a
single sequence (lN , aN , y). Denoting by O, E the sets of partial histories having
positive probability under, respectively, regimes o and e, we can restate (8) as
E ⊆ O. (9)
5.3. G-recursion
Let e ∈ S∗. Given enough data collected under owe can identify p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o)
(i = 1, . . . , N + 1) for (li−1, ai−1) ∈ O. Under simple stability (7) and positiv-
ity (9), this will also give us p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; e) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1) for all
(li−1, ai−1) ∈ E . If, further, e is a control strategy, then using the known form
for p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e) ((li, ai) ∈ E), we have all the ingredients to apply (3) and
(4) and thus identify the consequence of regime e from data collected under o.
Specifically, we have
f(li, ai−1) =
∑
ai
p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e)× f(li, ai) (10)
f(li−1, ai−1) =
∑
li
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o)× f(li, ai−1). (11)
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We start the recursion with
f(lN , aN ) ≡ E{k(Y ) | lN , aN ; e} =
{
E{k(Y ) | lN , aN ; o} if (lN , aN ) ∈ E
0 otherwise
(using simple stability for i = N + 1), and exit with the desired interventional
consequence f(∅) ≡ E{k(Y ) ; e}.
We refer to the above method as G-recursion.4
For the case that e is a non-randomized strategy, G-recursion can be based
on (5), becoming
f(li−1) =
∑
li
p(li | li−1, gi−1; o)× f(li), (12)
starting with f(lN ) = E{k(Y ) | lN , gN ; o}. TheG-computation formula (Robins,
1986) is the algebraic formula for f(∅) in terms of f(lN ) that results when we
write out explicitly the successive substitutions required to perform this recur-
sion.
Finally we remark that, when the simple stability property (6) holds for
(L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ), it also holds for (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y
∗), where Y ∗
is any function of (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ). For i ≤ N there is nothing new to
show, while (6) for i = N + 1 follows easily for Y ∗ when it holds for Y , using
general properties of conditional independence (Dawid, 1979). It is also easy
to see that when positivity, Definition 5.2, holds for (LN , AN , Y ) it likewise
holds for (LN , AN , Y
∗). Consequently, under the same conditions that allow
G-recursion to compute the interventional distribution of Y , we can use it to
compute that of Y ∗. In particular (see footnote 1), this will allow us to evaluate
the expected loss of applying e, even when the loss function depends on all of
(LN , AN , Y ).
6. Extended stability
We have already alluded to the possibility that, in many applications, the simple
stability assumption (6) might not be easy to justify directly. This might be the
case, in particular, when we are concerned about the possibility of ‘confounding
effects’ due to unobserved influential variables.
In such a case we might proceed by constructing a more detailed model,
incorporating a collection U of additional, possibly unobserved, variables; and
investigate its implications. These unobserved variables might be termed ‘se-
quential (potential) confounders’. Under certain additional assumptions to be
discussed below, we might then be able to deduce that simple stability does,
after all, apply. This programme can be helpful when the assumptions involving
the additional variables are easier to justify than assumptions referring only to
4Cases in which simple stability may not hold but we can nevertheless still apply G-
recursion are considered in Section 8.
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the variables of direct interest. We here initially express these additional as-
sumptions purely algebraically, in terms of conditional independence; in § 7 we
shall conduct a parallel analysis utilising influence diagrams to facilitate the
expression and manipulation of the relevant conditional independencies.
Reasoning superficially similar to ours has been conducted by Pearl and Robins
(1995) and Robins (1997). However, that is mostly based on the assumed exis-
tence of a ‘causal DAG’ representation of the problem. We once again emphasise
that the simple stability property (6) is always meaningful of itself, and its truth
or falsity can not rely on the possibility of carrying out such a programme of
reduction from a more complex model including unobservable variables.
6.1. Preliminaries
We shall specifically investigate models having a property we term extended sta-
bility. Such a model again involves a collection L of observable domain variables
(including a response variable Y ) and a collection A of action domain variables,
together with a regime indicator variable σ taking values in S = {o} ∪ S∗. But
now we also have the collection U of unobservable domain variables (for sim-
plicity we suppose throughout that which variables are observed or unobserved
is the same under all regimes considered). Let I ′ denote an ordering of all these
observable and unobservable domain variables (typically, though not necessar-
ily, their time-ordering). As before we assume that Ai−1 comes before Ai in this
ordering. We term I ′ an extended information base. Let Li ⊆ L [resp., Ui ⊆ U ]
denote the set of observed [resp., unobserved] variables between Ai−1 and Ai.
Definition 6.1 We say that the problem exhibits extended stability with re-
spect to the extended information base I ′ and the set S of regimes if, for
i = 1, . . . , N + 1,
(Ui, Li)⊥⊥ σ | (U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1). (13)
(If the (Ui) were observable, this would be identical with the definition of simple
stability.)
Under extended stability the marginal distribution of U1 is supposed the same
in both regimes, as is the conditional distribution of U2 given (U1, L1, A1), etc.
Similarly, the distributions of L1 given U1, of L2 given (U1, L1, A1, U2),. . . , and
finally of Y (= LN+1) given (U1, L1, A1, . . . , UN , LN , AN ), are all supposed to
be independent of the regime operating.
There is a corresponding extension of Definition 5.2:
Definition 6.2 We say the problem exhibits extended positivity if, for any e ∈
S∗, Pe ≪ Po as distributions over (LN , UN , AN , Y ); that is, p(E; e) > 0 ⇒
p(E; o) > 0 and any event E defined in terms of (LN , UN , AN , Y ).
In many problems, though by no means universally, an extended stability
assumption might be regarded as more reasonable and defensible than simple
stability — so long as appropriate unobserved variables U are taken into account.
For example, this might be the case if we believed that, in the observational
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regime, the actions were chosen by a decision-maker who had been able to
observe, in sequence, some or all of the variables in the problem, including
possibly the U ’s; and was then operating a control strategy with respect to this
extended information base, so that, when choosing each action, he was taking
account of all previous variables in this extended sequence, but nothing else.
But even then, as discussed in § 5.2, the extended stability property is a strong
additional assumption, that needs to be justified in any particular problem. And
again, because it involves the relationships between distributions under different
regimes, it can not be justified on the basis of considerations or findings that
apply only to one regime.
Unobservable variables can assist in modelling the observational regime and
its relationship with the interventional control regimes under consideration. But,
because they are unobserved, they can not form part of the information taken
into account by such control regimes. Thus we shall still be concerned with evalu-
ating — using G-recursion when possible — a regime e that is a control strategy
with respect to the observable information base I = (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) as
introduced in § 5.1. More specifically, in this more general context we define:
Condition 6.1 (Control strategy) The regime e is a control strategy if, for
i = 1, . . . , N ,
Ai⊥⊥U i | (Li, Ai−1 ; e) (14)
and, in addition, the conditional distribution of Ai, given (Li, Ai−1), under
regime e, is known to the analyst.
Condition 6.1 expresses the property that, under regime e, the randomization
distribution or other sources of uncertainty about Ai, given all earlier variables,
does not in fact depend on the earlier unobserved variables; and that this con-
ditional distribution is known. The condition will hold, in particular, in the
important common case that, under e, Ai is fully specified as a function of
previous observables.
6.2. Stability regained
When there are unobservables in the problem, the extended positivity property
of Definition 6.2 will clearly imply the simple positivity property of Definition 5.2.
However, even when extended stability holds, the simple stability property, with
respect to the observable information base (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) from which
(as is a pragmatic necessity) we have had to exclude the unobserved variables,
will typically fail. But we can sometimes incorporate additional background
knowledge, most usefully expressed in terms of conditional independence, to
show that it does, after all, hold.
We now describe two sets of additional sufficient (though not necessary) con-
ditions, either of which will, when appropriate, allow us to deduce the simple
stability property (6) — and with it, the possibility of applying G-recursion
(ignoring the unobservable variables), as set out in § 5.3. The results in this sec-
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tion can be regarded as extending the analysis of Dawid (2002) § 8.3 (see also
Guo and Dawid (2010)) to the sequential setting.
6.2.1. Sequential randomization
It has frequently been proposed (e.g., Robins (1986, 1997)) that when, under
an observational regime, the actions (Ai) have been physically (sequentially)
randomized, then simple stability (6) will hold. Indeed, our concept of simple
stability has also been termed ‘sequential randomization’ (Robins, 1986). How-
ever we shall be more specific and restrict the term sequential randomization to
the special case that we have extended stability and, in addition, Condition 6.2
below holds. We shall show that these properties are indeed sufficient to imply
simple stability — but they are by no means necessary.
So consider now the following condition:
Condition 6.2
Ai⊥⊥U i | (Li, Ai−1 ; σ) (i = 1, . . . , N). (15)
This is essentially a discrete-time version of Definition 2 (ii) of Arjas and Parner
(2004), but with the additional vital requirement that the unobservable variables
U involved already be such as to allow us to assume the extended stability
property (13). (Without such an underlying assumption there can be no way of
relating different regimes together.)
Condition 6.2 requires that, for each regime, any earlier unobserved variables
in the extended information base I ′ can have no further effect on the distribu-
tion of Ai, once the earlier observed variables are taken into account. This will
certainly be the case when, under each regime, treatment assignment, at any
stage, is determined by some deterministic or randomizing device that only has
the values of those earlier observed variables as inputs. While this will neces-
sarily hold for a control strategy with respect to the observed information base,
whether or not it is a reasonable requirement for the observational regime will
depend on deeper consideration of the specific context and circumstances. It
will typically do so if all information available to and utilised by the decision-
maker (the doctor, for instance) in the observational regime is included in Li,
or, indeed, if the actions (Ai) have been physically randomized within levels of
(Li, Ai−1).
Theorem 6.1 Suppose our model exhibits extended stability. If in addition Condition 6.2
holds, then we shall also have the simple stability property (6).
Proof. Our proof will be based on universal general properties of conditional
independence, as described by Dawid (1979, 1998).
Let Ei, Ri, Hi denote, respectively, the following assertions:
Ei : (Li, Ui)⊥⊥σ | (Li−1, U i−1, Ai−1)
Ri : Ai⊥⊥U i | (Li, Ai−1;σ)
Hi : (Li, U i)⊥⊥σ | (Li−1, Ai−1)
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Extended stability is equivalent to Ei holding for all i, so we assume that;
while Ri is just Condition 6.2, which we are likewise assuming for all i. We
shall show that these assumptions imply Hi for all i, which in turn implies
Li⊥⊥σ | (Li−1, Ai−1), i.e., simple stability.
We proceed by induction. SinceE1 andH1 are both equivalent to (L1, U1)⊥⊥σ,
H1 holds.
Suppose now Hi holds. Conditioning on Li yields
U i⊥⊥ σ | (Li, Ai−1), (16)
and this together with Ri is equivalent to U i⊥⊥ (Ai, σ) | (Li, Ai−1), which on
conditioning on Ai then yields
U i⊥⊥σ | (Li, Ai). (17)
Also, by Ei+1 we have
(Li+1, Ui+1)⊥⊥σ | (Li, U i, Ai). (18)
Taken together, (17) and (18) are equivalent to Hi+1, so the induction is estab-
lished. ✷
6.2.2. Sequential irrelevance
Another possible condition is:
Condition 6.3
Li⊥⊥U i−1 | (Li−1, Ai−1 ; σ) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1). (19)
In contrast to (15), (19) does permit the unobserved variables to date, U i, to in-
fluence the next action Ai (which can however only happen in the observational
regime), as well as the current observable Li; but they do not affect the sub-
sequent development of the L’s (including, in particular, the response variable
Y ).
Theorem 6.2 Suppose:
(i). Extended stability, (13), holds.
(ii). Sequential irrelevance, Condition 6.3, holds for the observational regime
σ = o:
Li⊥⊥U i−1 | (Li−1, Ai−1;σ = o) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1). (20)
(iii). Extended positivity, as in Definition 6.2, holds.
Then we shall have simple stability:
Li⊥⊥ σ | (Li−1, Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1). (21)
Moreover, sequential irrelevance holds under any regime:
Li⊥⊥U i−1 | (Li−1, Ai−1;σ) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1). (22)
A. P. Dawid and V. Didelez/Identifying dynamic strategies 18
Proof. Let k(Li) be a bounded real function of Li, and, for each regime s ∈ S,
let h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; s) be a version of E{k(Li) | U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; s}.
By (20) there exists f(Li−1, Ai−1) such that
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; o) = f(Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Po] (23)
whence, from (8), for all s ∈ S,
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; o) = f(Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Ps]. (24)
Also, from (13),
Li⊥⊥ σ | U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1 (25)
and so there exists g(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1) such that, for all s ∈ S,
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; s) = g(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Ps]. (26)
In particular,
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; o) = g(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Po], (27)
so that, again using (8),
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; o) = g(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Ps]. (28)
Combining (24), (26) and (28), we obtain
h(U i−1, Li−1, Ai−1; s) = f(Li−1, Ai−1) a.s. [Ps]. (29)
Since this property holds for all s ∈ S and every bounded real function k(Li),
we deduce
Li⊥⊥ (U i−1, σ) | (Li−1, Ai−1) (30)
from which both (21) and (22) follow. ✷
It is worth noting that we do not need the full force of extended stabil-
ity for the above proof, but only (25). In particular, we could allow arbi-
trary dependence of Ui on any earlier variables, including σ. We note fur-
ther that the above proof makes essential use of the extended positivity prop-
erty of Definition 6.2: (21) can not be deduced from extended stability and
Condition 6.3 making use of the standard conditional independence axioms
(Dawid, 1998, 2001; Pearl and Paz, 1987) alone.
Although we can certainly deduce simple stability when we can assume the
conditions of either Theorem 6.1 or Theorem 6.2, it can also arise our of ex-
tended stability in other ways. For example, this can be so when Condition 6.2
holds for some subsets of U i, while Condition 6.3 holds for some subsets of U i−1.
Such cases are addressed by Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 of Robins (1997); we give
examples in § 7.2.3 below.
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7. Influence diagrams
As previously mentioned, it is often helpful (though never essential) to represent
and manipulate conditional independence properties graphically, using the for-
malism of influence diagrams (IDs). In particular, when including unobserved
variables U and assuming extended stability, we can often deduce directly from
graph-theoretic separation properties whether simple stability holds.
7.1. Semantics
Here we very briefly describe the semantics of IDs, and show how they can
facilitate logical arguments by displaying implied properties in a particularly
transparent form. We shall use the theory and notation of Cowell et al. (1999)
and Dawid (2002) in relation to directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and IDs, and
their application to probability and decision models. The reader is referred to
these sources for more details.
For any DAG or ID D, its moral graph, or moralization, is the undirected
graph mo(D) in which first an edge is inserted between any unlinked parents
of a common child in D, and then all directions are ignored. For any set S of
nodes of D we denote the smallest ancestral subgraph of D containing S by
anD(S), and its moralization by manD(S) (we may omit the specification of
D when this is clear). For sets A,B,C of nodes of D we write A⊥⊥D B | C,
and say C separates A from B (with respect to D) to mean that, in man(A ∪
B ∪ C), every path joining A to B intersects C. Let nd(V ) and pa(V ) denote
the non-descendants and parents of a random node V , then it can be shown
(Dawid, 2002; Lauritzen et al., 1990) that, whenever a probability distribution
or decision problem is represented by D, in the sense that for any such V the
probabilistic conditional independence V ⊥⊥ nd(V ) | pa(V ) holds, we have
A⊥⊥D B | C ⇒ A⊥⊥B | C. (31)
This moralization criterion thus allows us to infer probabilistic independence
properties from purely graph-theoretic separation properties.5
While the above allows us to read off conditional independencies from a
DAG, we can, conversely, construct an ID D from a given collection of joint
distributions over the domain variables (one for each regime) in the following
way.
The node-set is given by V = {σ}∪L∪U ∪A. The graph has random (round)
nodes for all the domain variables, and a founder decision (square) node for σ.
The ordering given by the extended information base I ′ induces an ordering on
V such that any nodes in the (possibly empty) sets Li, Ui come after Ai−1 and
before Ai, and LN+1 ≡ Y is last. In addition we require the node σ to be prior
to any domain variables in this ordering. With each node ν ∈ V0 := V \ {σ}
5An alternative, and entirely equivalent, approach can be based on the ‘d-separation cri-
terion’ (Pearl, 2009; Verma and Pearl, 1990). We have found (31) more straightforward to
understand and apply.
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is associated its collection of conditional distributions, given values for all its
predecessors , pre(ν), in the ordering (including, in particular, specification of
the relevant regime).
For each such ν we will have a conditional independence (CI) property of the
form:
C(ν) : ν⊥⊥pre(ν) | pa(ν)
where pa(ν) is some given subset of pre(ν). Thus C(ν) asserts that the distribu-
tions of ν, given all its predecessors, in fact only depends on the values of those
in pa(ν). Note that property C(ν) will be vacuous, and can be omitted, when
pa(ν) = pre(ν). Such a collection, C say, of CI properties is termed recursive. We
represent C graphically by drawing an arrow into each node ν ∈ V0 from each
member of its parent set pa(ν), and we associate with ν the ‘parent-child’ con-
ditional probabilities of the form p(ν = ν∗ | pa(ν) = pa∗). The ID constructed
in this way will ensure that the joint distribution of the domain variables, in
each regime, satisfies any conditional independencies obtained by applying the
moralization criterion (31).
From this point on, when we use the terms ‘parents’, ‘ancestors’ etc., the
regime node σ will be excluded from these sets. Also, while in general the terms
Li, Ui could each refer to a collection of variables, for simplicity we shall consider
only the case in which they represent just one (or sometimes none), and so can
be modelled (if present at all) by a single node in the graph.
We emphasise that IDs are related to but distinct from ‘causal DAGs’ (Pearl,
1995; Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000). For a discussion see Dawid (2010)
and Didelez, Kreiner and Keiding (2010).
7.2. Extended stability
The extended stability property (13) embodies a recursive collection of CI prop-
erties with respect to the ordering induced by the extended information base.
Consequently it can be faithfully expressed by an ID D satisfying:
Condition 7.1 The only arrows out of σ in D are into A.
For N = 2 this is depicted in Figure 2. Note that the subgraph corresponding
to the domain variables is complete.
7.2.1. Sequential randomization
With the ordering induced by the extended information base I ′, (13) and (15)
together form a recursive collection C of CI properties. Therefore the conditions
of Theorem 6.1 can be faithfully represented graphically in an ID D, in which,
for extended stability, the only arrows out of σ are into the A’s, while also, for
sequential randomization, there are no arrows into the A’s from the U ’s. Thus
starting from Figure 2, for example, we simply delete all the arrows from a U
to an A, so obtaining Figure 3.
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A1 A2
L1 L2
U2U1
σ
Y
Fig 2. Unobserved variables: N = 2
A2
L1 L2
U2U1
σ
Y
A1
Fig 3. ID showing sequential randomization.
We can now verify Theorem 6.1 using only graphical manipulations, as fol-
lows.
Since, under (13), the only children of σ are action variables, and under
(15) no action variable can be a child of any unobservable variable, it follows
that in man(σ, Li, Ai−1) there will be no direct link between σ and any U ∈
U . A similar argument shows that (13) implies that there is no direct link in
man(σ, Li, Ai−1) between σ and Li. It follows that every path from Li to σ must
pass through one of the remaining variables, i.e. (Li−1, Ai−1), demonstrating
that Li⊥⊥D σ | (Li−1, Ai−1) for i = 1, . . . , N+1. Simple stability (6) now follows
from (31).
7.2.2. Sequential irrelevance
The case of sequential irrelevance is more subtle. This is because when we com-
bine extended stability (13) with sequential irrelevance (19) we do not obtain a
recursive collection of CI properties. Consequently this combined collection of
conditional independencies cannot be faithfully represented by any ID.
It might be thought that, starting with an ID representing extended stability,
we could operate on it to incorporate (19) also simply by deleting all arrows from
A. P. Dawid and V. Didelez/Identifying dynamic strategies 22
Ui into Lj for j > i. Doing this to Figure 2 yields the ID of Figure 4. However,
that ID also represents the stronger property (30) (shown by the absence of edges
from σ and U i−1 into Li), which does not follow from (13) and (19) without
imposing further, non-graphical conditions (as was done in Theorem 6.2). We
can indeed read off the stability property (6) from Figure 4, but while that
graph thus displays clearly the conclusion of Theorem 6.2, it does not supply
an alternative graphical proof.
A1 A2
L1 L2
U2U1
σ
Y
Fig 4. ID implying sequential irrelevance.
By omitting some of the nodes and/or arrows in an ID, such as Figure 3 or
Figure 4, that already embodies either sequential randomization or sequential
irrelevance, we obtain simpler special cases with the same property. Two such
examples, starting from Figure 4, are given in Figure 5.
A1 A2
L2
σ
Y
U1
A1 A2
L2
σ
Y
U2
Fig 5. Specialisations of Figure 4
7.2.3. Further examples
As mentioned before, we can have simple stability even when both sequential
randomization and sequential irrelevance (or more precisely, the conditions of
Theorems 6.1 and 6.2) fail. Two examples are given by the IDs of Figure 6.
Applying the moralisation criterion to the graphs, we verify, for example, that
in both IDs of Figure 6 simple stability is satisfied.
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A1 A2
L1 L2
U1
σ
YU2
A1 A2
L1 L2
U1
σ
YU2
Fig 6. Alternative IDs displaying stability
In full generality it is easy to see, using Condition 7.1, that application of
the moralization criterion to D to check the simple stability condition (6) is
equivalent to checking that, for each i, Li−1 satisfies Pearl’s back-door criterion
(Pearl, 1995) relative to (Ai−1, Li). (Pearl only considers atomic interventions,
but our analysis shows that this condition also allows identification of condi-
tional interventions.)
7.2.4. Positivity
Suppose that (whether by appealing to sequential randomization, or to sequen-
tial irrelevance, or the back-door criterion, or otherwise) we have been able to
demonstrate simple stability with respect to an observable information base.
Suppose further that e is a control strategy in the sense of Condition 6.1. It
will now follow that we can use G-recursion, exactly as in § 5.3, to identify the
consequence of regime e from data gathered under regime o — so long only as
we can also ensure the positivity constraint of Definition 5.2.
It is easy to see that a sufficient condition for Definition 5.2 to hold is:
Condition 7.2 (Parent-child positivity) For each A ∈ A, and each config-
uration (a, pa∗) of (A, pa
D
(A)), p(a | pa∗; e) > 0⇒ p(a | pa∗; o) > 0.
More generally, suppose that we specify, for each entry in each parent-child
conditional probability table for the ID D, whether it is zero or non-zero. We
can then apply constraint propagation algorithms (Dechter, 2003) to determine
E and O. One such method (Dawid, 1992) uses an analogue of the computa-
tional method of probability propagation (Cowell et al., 1999). This generates
a collection of ‘cliques’ (subsets of the variables) with, for each clique, an as-
signment of 1 (meaning possible) or 0 (impossible) to each configuration of its
variables. Definition 5.2 will then hold if and only if, for each clique containing
σ, no entry changes from 0 to 1 when we change the value of σ from o to e.
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8. A more general approach
The simple stability condition (6) requires that, for each i, the conditional distri-
bution of Li, given the earlier variables (Li−1, Ai−1), should be the same under
both regimes o and e — a strong assumption that, in certain problems, one
might be unwilling to accept directly, and unable to deduce, as in § 6.2, from
more acceptable assumptions. However, while we have shown that stability (to-
gether with Definition 5.2) is sufficient to support G-recursion, it turns out not
to be necessary.
In this section we first give some very general conditions under which G-
recursion can be justified; then we consider their specific application to models
incorporating extended stability. Our analysis parallels parts of Robins (1987)
(see also Section 3.4 of Robins (1997)), in which the ‘sequential randomization’
assumption is relaxed. We consider the relation between the two approaches in
more detail in § 10.2.
Rather than work directly with (10) and (11), we combine them into the
following form:
f(li−1, ai−1) =
∑
li
∑
ai
p(li | li−1, ai−1; o)× p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e)× f(li, ai). (32)
To justify G-recursion it is enough to demonstrate the applicability of (32).
8.1. G-recursion: General conditions
A primitive building block of our model is the specification of the interven-
tional conditional probabilities p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e). We suppose that this is well-
defined (e.g. by deterministic functions or specified randomization) at least for
all (li, ai−1) ∈ O (1 ≤ i ≤ N), even if (li, ai−1) 6∈ E .
We introduce a function γ : H → {0, 1} defined by:
γ(h) :=
{
1 if h ∈ O and
∏i
j=1 p(aj | lj , aj−1 ; e) > 0
0 otherwise.
(33)
In (33), i is the highest index of an action variable appearing in h, i.e. h = (li, ai)
or (li+1, ai). Note that if h is an initial segment of h
′, then γ(h) = 0⇒ γ(h′) = 0.
We define:
Γ := {h ∈ H : γ(h) = 1} (34)
(so that, in particular, Γ ⊆ O).
We now impose the following positivity condition in place of Definition 5.2:
Condition 8.1 For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , if (li, ai−1) is in Γ and p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e) > 0,
then (li, ai) is in O (and thus in Γ).
This requires that, subsequent to any partial history (li, ai−1) in Γ, if some value
of the next action variable can be generated by intervention, it can also arise
observationally.
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Our approach now involves the construction, if possible, of a sequence of joint
distributions pi( · ) (i = 0, . . . , N) for all the variables in the problem, such that
p0(y) ≡ p(y ; e), (35)
and certain further properties hold, as described below. For maximum applica-
bility these are stated here in a very abstract and general form. Some concrete
cases where we can specify suitable (pi) and verify that they have the requisite
properties are treated in § 8.2 and § 10.2 below.
Let the class of partial histories h ∈ H having positive probability under pi
be denoted by Bi, and let Γi := Bi ∩ Γ.
We require the following positivity property:
(li, ai) ∈ Bi ⇔ (li, ai) ∈ O. (36)
Since Γ ⊆ O, from ‘⇐’ in (36) we readily deduce
(li, ai) ∈ Γ⇔ (li, ai) ∈ Γi. (37)
More substantively we require:
pi−1(li | li−1, ai−1) = p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1) (38)
pi−1(ai | li, ai−1) = p(ai | li, ai−1 ; e) (i = 1, . . . , N + 1) (39)
pi−1(y | li, ai) = pi(y | li, ai) (i = 1, . . . , N) (40)
whenever, in each case, the conditioning partial history on the left-hand side is
in Γi−1 (in which case the conditional probabilities on both sides are unambigu-
ously defined).
Suppose now that such a collection of distributions (pi) can be found. Let H0
denote the set of all partial histories of the form (li, ai) for some i. We define a
function f : H0 → ℜ by:
f(h) := γ(h)× Ei{k(Y ) | h}, (41)
for h = (li, ai), where Ei denotes expectation under pi. We note that f is well-
defined, since γ(h) 6= 0⇒ h ∈ O, whence h ∈ Bi by (36).
For h = (lN , aN ), if γ(h) 6= 0 then by (37) h ∈ ΓN , so that we can apply (38)
for i = N + 1 to see that:
f(lN , aN ) =
{
E{k(Y ) | lN , aN ; o} if (lN , aN ) ∈ Γ
0 otherwise.
(42)
Also, by (35),
f(∅) = p(y ; e). (43)
Lemma 8.1 Under Condition 8.1 and properties (35)–(40), the G-recursion
(32) holds for the interpretation (41).
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Proof. If γ(li−1, ai−1) = 0 then both sides of (32) are 0.
Otherwise (li−1, ai−1) is in Γ and so, by (37), in Γi−1. We have:
f(li−1, ai−1) = Ei−1{k(Y ) | li−1, ai−1}
=
∑
li
∑
ai
pi−1(li | li−1, ai−1)× pi−1(ai | li, ai−1)× Ei−1{k(Y ) | li, ai}.
(44)
Denote the three terms on the right-hand side of (44) by Tl, Ta, Ty, respectively.
By (38) Tl = p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o). We do not need to consider the other terms
when Tl is 0. Otherwise, (li, ai−1) is in Γi−1. By (39), we now have Ta = p(ai |
li, ai−1 ; e). Again we do not have to worry about Ty unless Ta is non-zero. In
that case (li, ai) is in Bi−1 and also, by Condition 8.1, in Γ, hence in Γi−1. We
can now use (40) to replace Ty by Ei{k(Y ) | li, ai} = f(li, ai), and the result
follows. ✷
Starting from (42), we can thus apply G-recursion as given by (32), or equiv-
alently by (10) and (11), to compute f(∅) — which, by (43), is just the desired
consequence of regime e. In this computation we only need consider partial
histories in Γ. When e is a deterministic strategy we recover the form (12) of
G-recursion.
Note that, for histories of intermediate length, the function f defined by
(41) involves the constructed distributions (pi), which need not have any real-
world interpretation. Note further that, in contrast to the case when stability
applies, even when we can use the above construction to compute the marginal
interventional distribution of the response variable Y , there is no guarantee
that we can identify the full joint interventional distribution of (LN , AN , Y ). In
particular, if the loss function depends on variables other than Y we may not
be able to estimate the expected loss of an interventional strategy on the basis
of observational data.
8.2. Extended stability
We now specialize the general approach of § 8.1 to problems exhibiting ex-
tended stability, as in (13). This can be regarded as extending the analysis
of Pearl and Robins (1995) to handle dynamic regimes, as also considered by
Robins (1997).6
We aim to identify a graphical counterpart to the conditions of § 8.1, that
would allow us to apply G-recursion to this extended information base so as to
identify the effect of regime e from observations made under o.
For the remainder of this section we consider a given information base I ′ that
induces an ordering of the nodes of the influence diagram D; in § 9 we consider
the converse, i.e. how to find an ordering of the information base from a given
influence diagram D such that the graphical check of § 8.2.1 succeeds.
6Both these papers refer for the details to an unpublished paper, Robins and Pearl (1996).
A. P. Dawid and V. Didelez/Identifying dynamic strategies 27
We impose Condition 7.2. It is then easy to see that Condition 8.1 will hold
(and in fact Γ = E). We also impose Condition 6.1 on the control strategy e.
For each i = 0, . . . , N , we now construct an artificial joint distribution pi( · )
for all the domain variables as follows. The distribution pi factors according to
the ID D′ = D with the node σ removed. The parent-child tables for any variable
V ∈ L ∪ U are unchanged from the original ones for D (which do not involve
σ). That for any action variable Aj for j ≤ i is the same as for D, conditional
on σ = o; while that for Aj (j > i) is the same as for D, conditional on σ = e.
With this definition, p0( · ) ≡ p( · ; e), so that (35) holds. Properties (36), and
(38) for i ≤ N , hold because the joint distribution of all variables up to and
including Li is the same under pi−1 as under p( · ; o); for (38) with i = N + 1,
when LN+1 ≡ Y , we also use the fact that extended stability, i.e. Condition 7.1,
implies that the distribution of Y given all earlier domain variables is the same
under both e and o.
Finally (39) holds because, by construction, the parent-child distribution for
Ai has the same specification for pi−1(·) as for p( · ; e) — and, by Condition 6.1,
pa(Ai) ⊆ (Li, Ai−1).
8.2.1. Graphical check
We have shown that, under Conditions 6.1 and 7.2, properties (35)–(39) hold
automatically for our above construction of (pi). However, whether or not (40)
holds will depend on more specific conditional independence properties of the
problem under study. We now describe a graphical method based on IDs for
checking this property.
For each action node A ∈ A we identify two subsets, pao(A) and pae(A), of
pa
D
(A), such that, when σ = o [resp. e], the conditional distribution of A, given
its domain parents, can be chosen to depend only on pao(A) [resp. pae(A)].
To ensure Condition 6.1, we suppose:
Condition 8.2 pae(A) ⊆ L ∪ A.
In order to investigate (40) for a specific value of i, we now construct, for
0 ≤ i ≤ N + 1, a new ID Di on V , as follows. The only arrow out of σ (again
a founder node) is now into Ai. For j < i, the parent set of Aj is pao(Aj) with
conditional distributions determined as under o; for j > i it is pae(Aj), with
conditional distributions determined as under e; finally, for Ai it is (pa(Ai) ; σ),
with conditional distributions exactly as in D. Any domain variable V ∈ L ∪
U has the same parent set pa(V ) (which will not include σ) and conditional
distributions as in D. We shall use ani(·) to denote a minimal ancestral set in
Di, with similar usages of ndi, ⊥⊥i, etc.
It is easy to see that the joint density of all the domain variables in D0 = De
is p0 = pe; in DN+1 = Do it is pN+1 = po; while in Di, given σ = o it is pi−1,
and given σ = e it is pi. Thus (40) will certainly hold if
Y ⊥⊥i σ | (Li, Ai) (45)
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holds. We can easily check (45) by inspection of the graph Di. Note that D0 is
similar to the ‘manipulated’ DAG of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000).
In summary we have shown the following:
Theorem 8.2 Under Conditions 7.2 and 8.2, if the graphical separation prop-
erty (45) holds for each i, then we can compute the consequence of regime e
from data gathered under regime o by means of the G-recursion (32), starting
with fN as in (42), and ending with f0 = p(y ; e).
A variant of this approach is described in Robins (1997), and works as follows.
Let D′i be obtained from Di by omitting the node σ, and deleting all arrows out
of Ai. Because moralization links in Di involving σ can only be to predecessors
of Ai, it is not difficult to see there exists a path from Y to σ avoiding (Li, Ai)
in manDi(Y, Li, Ai) if and only if there exists such a path from Y to pa(Ai) in
manD′
i
(Y, Li, Ai). And the latter condition can in turn be seen to be equivalent
to the existence, in that graph, of a path from Y to Ai avoiding (Li, Ai−1). Thus
Y ⊥⊥i σ | (Li, Ai) if and only if Y ⊥⊥D′
i
Ai | (Li, Ai−1). Hence we can prove (40)
by demonstrating the latter property.
It is shown in Dawid and Didelez (2008) that, under certain further condi-
tions — informally, that each intermediate variable has some influence on the
response under the interventional regime — when the graphical method de-
scribed above succeeds we can deduce that the problem in fact exhibits simple
stability with respect to the observed information base.
8.3. Examples
8.3.1. Stability
We first show that the conditions of § 5.2 are a special case of those of § 8.1, by
verifying that the construction of § 8.2.1 works for the case of simple stability,
as represented by Figure 1. In this case the (Ui) are absent, and, for each do-
main variable V , pae(V ) = pao(V ) = pre(V ). Thus Di consists of the complete
directed graph on (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ), together with an additional regime
node σ and an arrow from σ to Ai. Figure 7 shows these graphs for the case
N = 2, and Figure 8 the corresponding graphs D′i.
A1L1 A2L2 Y
σ
A1L1 A2L2 Y
σ
Fig 7. Influence diagrams D1, D2 for stability (N = 2)
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A1L1 A2L2 Y A1L1 A2L2 Y
Fig 8. Influence diagrams D′
1
, D′
2
for stability (N = 2)
Since, after moralization of Di, σ has direct links only into (Li, Ai), any path
in this moral graph joining Y to σ must intersect (Li, Ai), whence we deduce
(40). Equivalently, there is no path in D′i from Y to Ai avoiding (Li, Ai−1).
Hence we have confirmed that, when stability holds, it is possible to construct
a sequence of joint densities pi satisfying (38)–(40).
8.3.2. G-recursion without stability
More interesting is the possibility of applying the construction of § 8.2 to justify
G-recursion even in cases where simple stability does not hold. This is illustrated
by the following example, based on Pearl and Robins (1995) (and see Robins
(1987) and Robins (1997) for description of medical scenarios that are reasonably
captured by this example).
Example 8.1 Figure 9 shows a specific model incorporating extended stability
for the information base (U1, A1, U2, L2, A2, Y ) (with L1 = ∅). Note that this
does not embody simple stability, since moralization would create a direct link
between σ and U1, and hence a path L2—U1—σ that avoids A1. We thus can
not deduce L2⊥⊥σ | A1, as would be required for simple stability.
A1 A2
L2
U2U1
σ
Y
Fig 9. An ID displaying non-stability
We use stippled arrows to represent independence under the control regime
e. Thus the stippled arrow from U1 to A1 in Figure 9 represents the property
A1⊥⊥U1 | σ = e, (46)
which is (14) for i = 1. (The equivalent property for i = 2 is already implied by
the lack of any arrows from U1 and U2 to A2).
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The stippled arrow from L2 to A2 embodies an additionally assumed prop-
erty:
A2⊥⊥L2 | (A1 ; σ = e). (47)
That is, we are supposing that interventional assignment of A2 can only depend
(deterministically or stochastically) on the value chosen for the previous treat-
ment, A1. This is a restriction on the type of interventional strategy e that we
are considering. It will turn out that we can identify the causal effect of e from
the observational data gathered under o, using G-recursion, only for strategies
e of this special type.
In this problem we thus have pao(A1) = U1, pae(A1) = ∅, pao(A2) = (A1, L2),
pae(A2) = A1. The constructed IDs D1 and D2 are shown in Figure 10, and the
variant forms D′1 and D
′
2 (Pearl and Robins, 1995, Figure 2) in Figure 11.
A1 A2
L2
U2U1 Y
σ
A1 A2
L2
U2U1 Y
σ
Fig 10. Influence diagrams D1, D2 for Figure 9
A1 A2
L2
U2U1 Y
A1 A2
L2
U2U1 Y
Fig 11. Influence diagrams D′
1
, D′
2
for Figure 9
A1 A2
U2U1 Y
σ A2
U2 Y
A1
U1
Fig 12. Relevant moral ancestral graphs, for D1 and D′1
We first examine D1 to see if Y ⊥⊥D1 σ | A1. The relevant moral ancestral
graph (see Figure 12) is easily seen to have the desired separation property:
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thus we have shown (40) for i = 1. Alternatively, from examination of the
relevant moral ancestral graph based on D′1 we readily see the desired property
Y ⊥⊥D′
1
A1. (Note that this approach does not succeed if we allow A2 to depend
on L2 under e, thus retaining an arrow from L2 to A2 and so making L2 an
ancestor of Y in D1: in the now larger relevant moral ancestral graph formed
from D1 we could then trace a path Y—U2—U1—σ from Y to σ avoiding A1.)
Finally, since inD2 neither U1 nor U2 is a parent ofA2, even after moralization
there will be no direct link from σ to either U1 or U2: consequently any path
from Y to σ will have to intersect (A1, L2, A2). Equivalently, we see that in D′2,
after moralization (which adds a futher link between U1 and U2) every path
from Y to A2 intersects (A1, L2). We deduce Y ⊥⊥σ | (A1, L2, A2), i.e. (40) for
i = 2.
If we now assume Conditions 7.2 and 6.1 then, all the required conditions
being satisfied, we will have justified use of G-recursion to identify the conse-
quences of an interventional regime e of the specified form, from data collected
under the observational regime o. ✷
The graphical check illustrated above simplifies considerably in the case of an
unconditional interventional strategy e, where the values of the action variables
are determined in advance, as considered by Pearl and Robins (1995). In this
case pae(Ai) = ∅ for all i, and Di is obtained from D by deleting all arrows
into every Aj with j > i. Then D
′
i is obtained by further deleting σ and all
arrows out of Ai. However, if our aim is to compare strategies, and ideally find
an optimal one, it is necessary also to consider dynamic strategies.
9. Constructing an admissible sequence
In order to apply the graphical check of § 8.2.1 we need to have the variables
already completely ordered. More generally, we could ask whether there exists
an ordering (A1, . . . , AN ) of A, and (L1, . . . , LN) of disjoint subsets of L, such
that we can apply the construction of § 8.2.1 to show (45). Somewhat more re-
stricted, we might suppose an ordering (A1, . . . , AN ) already given, and look for
a sequence (L1, . . . , LN) to satisfy (45). Such a sequence will be termed admis-
sible. In this section we assume that a graphical representation of the problem
in form of an ID is given, and we note that by definition an admissible sequence
has to satisfy Li ⊆ nd(Ai, . . . , AN ). Below, we give conditions under which we
can determine whether such an admissible sequence exists, and construct one
if it does. We shall need some general properties of directed-graph separation
from Appendix A.
We impose the following conditions:
Condition 9.1 For all i,
pae(Ai) ⊆ pao(Ai).
This can always be ensured by redefining, if necessary, pao(Ai) as pao(Ai) ∪
pae(Ai), with any added parents having no effect on the conditional probabilities
for Ai under o.
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Condition 9.2 Each action variable A ∈ A is an ancestor of Y in De.
In typical contexts Condition 9.2 will hold, since we would not normally con-
template an intervention that has no effect on the response. Clearly when Con-
ditions 9.1 and 9.2 both hold every A ∈ A is also an ancestor of Y in Do = D.
Define, for i = 1, . . . , N :
Mi := L ∩ nde(Ai, Ai+1, . . . , AN ) ∩ ani(Y ). (48)
We note that Mi−1 ⊆ Mi. This follows from ani−1(Y ) ⊆ ani(Y ) which in
turn holds because, by Condition 9.1, the edge set of Di−1 is a subset of that of
Di.
Now let
L∗i :=Mi \Mi−1, (49)
so that Mi = L¯
∗
i . For the information sequence (L
∗
i ), the total information
taken into account up to time i, Mi, consists of just those variables in L that
are ancestors of Y in Di, but are not descendants of Ai or any later actions.
The sequence (L∗1, . . . , L
∗
N) will be admissible if, for i = 1, . . . , N ,
Y ⊥⊥i σ | (Mi, Ai). (50)
Taking into account Condition 9.2 and (48), (50) requires that Mi∪Ai sepa-
rate Y from σ in the undirected graph Gi obtained by moralizing the ancestral
set of Y in Di. It is thus straightforward to check whether or not it holds. When
it does we shall call i admissible.
The following result can be regarded as simultaneously simplifying, gener-
alizing, and rendering more operational that of Pearl and Robins (1995). In
particular, it supplies an explicit construction, while allowing for conditional
interventions.
Theorem 9.1 Under Conditions 9.1 and 9.2, if any admissible sequence exists
then (L∗1, . . . , L
∗
N) is admissible.
That is: There exists an admissible sequence if and only if every i is admissible.
In this case (L∗1, . . . , L
∗
N) is an admissible sequence.
Proof. Suppose that there exists some admissible sequence (L1, . . . , LN ). Then,
for each i,
Y ⊥⊥i σ | Li ∪ Ai. (51)
By Lemma A.2, this graph-theoretical separation continues to hold if we inter-
sect the conditioning set with (ani(Y ), σ). Since, by Condition 9.2, Ai ⊆ ani(Y ),
we obtain
Y ⊥⊥i σ |
(
Li ∩ ani(Y )
)
∪ Ai. (52)
But, Li ⊆ L∩nde(Ai, . . . , AN ); and thus Li∩ani(Y ) ⊆Mi. Hence, by Lemma A.2,
(50) holds, and the result follows. ✷
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Example 9.1 (We are indebted to Susan Murphy for this example.) In the
problem represented in Figure 13, it may be checked that the ‘obvious’ choice
L1 = {X}, L2 = {Z} is not an admissible sequence. Using the method above
yields L∗1 = {X,Z}, L
∗
2 = ∅, which is admissible (indeed, yields simple stability,
as may either be checked directly, or deduced from Theorem 2 in Dawid and Didelez
(2008)). ✷
A1 A2 YX Z
σU
Fig 13. Finding an admissible sequence
9.1. Finding a better sequence
While the above procedure will always construct an admissible sequence (L1, . . . , LN )
when one exists, that might not be the best possible. Thus in Figure 14, with
L = {X,Z}, we find L∗1 = {Z}, L
∗
2 = {X}. These satisfy (50), so that the se-
quence {L∗1, L
∗
2} is admissible. However a smaller admissible sequence is given
by L1 = ∅, L2 = {X}.
A2
X
A1
Y
Z
σ
Fig 14. A choice of admissible sequences
If we had initially regarded Z as unobservable, so taking L = {X}, we would
have found this smaller sequence. However in general we would need hindsight
or good fortune to start off with such a minimal specification of L.
Even without redefining L, however, we can often improve on the sequence
given by (49). At each stage i we first check (50). If this fails we abort the process.
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Otherwise, sequentially choose Li to be any subset of Mi, disjoint from Li−1,
such that (51) holds. (Since, by (50), (51) holds for the choice Li = Mi \ Li−1,
such a set must exist.) Then (if the process is never aborted) we shall have
constructed an admissible sequence (Li), improving on (L
∗
i ) in the sense that
Li ⊆ L
∗
i .
Ideally we would want the set Li to be small. When each Li is minimal, in
the sense that no proper subset of Li satisfies (51), we obtain a generalization of
the method of Pearl and Robins (1995) for constructing a minimal admissible
sequence. However in large problems the search for such a minimal Li can be
computationally non-trivial, and we may have to be satisfied with some other
choices for the (Li). Minimality is in any case not a requirement for admissibility.
9.2. Admissible orderings of A
In general there will be several orderings of A possible. It can then happen that
an admissible sequence (L1, . . . , LN) exists for one ordering of A (which we may
then likewise call admissible), but not for another.
Example 9.2 In the ID of Figure 15, U = {U}, L = {L}, A = {A,B}. Note
that A⊥⊥B under either regime. Both A1 = A,A2 = B and A1 = B,A2 = A
are possible orderings of A. For the former choice we find M1 = ∅; then (50)
for i = 1 becomes Y ⊥⊥DA σ | A, where DA is D with the arrow from σ to B
removed. Since this is easily seen to fail (moralization creates a link between
U and σ), Theorem 9.1 implies that there can be no admissible sequence to
support G-recursion. However if we take A1 = B,A2 = A, we obtain M1 = ∅,
M2 = {L}, and (50) becomes Y ⊥⊥DB σ | B for i = 1, Y ⊥⊥DA σ | (B,L,A) for
i = 2, where DB is D with the arrows into A from both σ and U removed. Both
of these properties are easily confirmed to hold. We can thus (under suitable
positivity conditions) apply G-recursion with respect to the admissible ordering
(B,L,A). ✷
As yet we do not have a method that will automatically identify an admissible
ordering of A when one exists.
σ
Y
U
A
L
B
Fig 15. Unordered actions
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10. Potential response models
In this section, we examine the relationship between the potential response (PR)
approach to dynamic treatments and our own decision-theoretic one.
The PR approach typically confines attention to non-randomized, though
possibly dynamic, strategies. Such a strategy is defined by a function g on the
set of all ‘partial L-histories’ of the form (li) (1 ≤ i ≤ N), such that, for each i,
g(li) is one of the available options for Ai. We shall write g(li) for the sequence
(g(l1), g(l1, l2), . . . , g(li)). Under this strategy, if at time i we have observed
Li = li, the next action will be Ai = g(li).
We henceforth confine attention to a pair of regimes S = {o, e}, where o
is observational, while e is a non-randomized strategy, determined by a given
function g as described above.
10.1. Potential responses and stability
We first interpret and analyse the model introduced by Robins (1986) (see also
Robins (1997), Section 3.3; Robins (2000); Murphy (2003)).
We need to introduce, for each regime s ∈ {o, e}, a collection of ‘potential
variables’ Πs := (Ls,1, As,1, . . . , Ls,N , As,N , Ls,N+1 ≡ Ys). It is supposed that,
when regime s is operating, the actual observable variables in the problem,
(L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ), will be those in Πs.
Note that, by the definition of e, we have the functional constraint
Ae,i = g(Le,i) (i = 1, . . . , N). (53)
All the potential variables, across both regimes, are regarded as having si-
multaneous existence, their values being unaffected by which regime is actually
followed.7 The effect of following regime s is thus to uncover the values of some
of these, viz. those in Πs, while hiding others.
This collection of all potential observables across both regimes is further
considered to have a joint distribution (respecting the logical constraints (53)),
whose density we denote by p(·). This distribution is supposed unaffected by
which regime is in operation: all this can do is change the relationship between
potential and actual variables.
Since, under e, Y ≡ Ye, the consequence of the interventional strategy e is
simply the marginal distribution of Ye. Our aim is to identify this distribution
from observations made under regime o.
It can be shown directly that this can be effected by means of the G-recursion
formula under the following conditions:
Condition 10.1 (Positivity) Whenever p(Lo,N = lN ) > 0,
p(Ao,N = g(lN ) | Lo,N = lN ) > 0.
7Note, as a matter of logic, that if we follow e we shall not be able to observe e.g. Yo
(though see the note after Condition 10.2 below). This is a version of the so-called ‘fundamental
problem of causal inference’ (Holland, 1986) which has been critically discussed by Dawid
(2000).
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That is, in the observational regime, for any set of values lN of the variables LN
that can arise with positive probability, there is a positive probability that the
actions taken will be those specified by e.
Condition 10.2 (Consistency) If Ao,i = g(Lo,i), then Lo,i+1 = Le,i+1 (i =
0, . . . , N).
(Note that for i = 0 the antecedent of this condition is vacuously satisfied, while
for i = N its conclusion is Yo = Ye.)
That is, if, in the observational regime, we happen to obtain a partial history
(li, ai) that could also be obtained under the operation of e, then we will next
observe the identical variable Le,i+1 that would have been observed if we had
been operating e. (This condition of course imposes further logical constraints
on the joint distribution p).
Condition 10.3 (Sequential ignorability) Whenever p(Lo,i = li) > 0,
Ao,i⊥⊥L
i+1
e | (Lo,i = li, Ao,i−1 = g(li−1)) (i = 1, . . . , N),
(where L
j
e := (Le,j , Le,j+1, . . . , Le,N , Ye)).
That is, in the observational regime, given any partial history consistent with
the operation of e, the next action is independent of all the future potential
observables associated with e.8
10.1.1. Connexions
We now consider the relationship between the above approach and that of § 5.2,
which founds G-recursion on the stability property (6). We will show that Con-
ditions 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 imply our conditions in § 5.2. Our reasoning is, in
spirit, very similar to Theorem 3.1 of Robins (1997) (see also Robins (1986),
Theorem 4.1).
Lemma 10.1 If Conditions 10.2 and 10.3 hold, then for any sequence lN+1 =
(l1, . . . , lN , y) such that p(Le,N = lN ) > 0,
p(L
i+1
e = l
i+1
| Le,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)) = p(L
i+1
e = l
i+1
| Le,i = li) (54)
for i = 0, . . . , N .
Proof. First note that, from Condition 10.2, when Ao,i = g(li), Lo,i+1 = li+1
is equivalent to Le,i+1 = li+1. So from Condition 10.3
Ao,i+1⊥⊥L
i+2
e | (Le,i+1 = li+1, Ao,i = g(li)). (55)
We now show (54) by induction on i.
8This is sometimes expressed in a stronger form that drops the restriction to future vari-
ables, so replacing Li+1e by (Le,N , Ye) (Robins, 2000).
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It holds trivially for i = 0. Suppose then it holds for i. Conditioning both
sides on Le,i+1 = li+1 then yields
p(L
i+2
e = l
i+2
| Le,i+1 = li+1, Ao,i = g(li)) = p(L
i+2
e = l
i+2
| Le,i+1 = li+1).
But from (55) we have
p(L
i+2
e = l
i+2
| Le,i+1 = li+1, Ao,i+1 = g(li+1))
= p(L
i+2
e = l
i+2
| Le,i+1 = li+1, Ao,i = g(li)).
Hence (54) holds with i replaced by i+ 1 and the induction proceeds. ✷
Theorem 10.2 If Conditions 10.2 and 10.3 hold, then so does the stability
condition (6).
Proof. Because of (53), and the restriction immediately below the density
interpretation (7) of (6), it is enough to show that p(Le,i+1 = li+1 | Le,i =
li, Ae,i = g(li)) = p(Lo,i+1 = li+1 | Lo,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)). But, again by (53),
p(Le,i+1 = li+1 | Le,i = li, Ae,i = g(li)) = p(Le,i+1 = li+1 | Le,i = li). By
Lemma 10.1, this is the same as p(Le,i+1 = li+1 | Le,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)), and
by Condition 10.2 this is in turn the same as p(Lo,i+1 = li+1 | Le,i = li, Ao,i =
g(li)). ✷
Finally, in the light of (53), it is easy to see that Condition 10.1 implies pos-
itivity as given by Definition 5.2.
In summary, whenever the conditions usually used to justify G-recursion in
the potential response framework hold, so will our own (as in § 5.2). But our
conditions are more general in that they do not require the existence of, let
alone any probabilistic relationships between, potential responses under different
regimes; and can, moreover, just as easily handle randomized interventional
strategies, which are more problematic for the PR approach.
10.2. Potential responses without stability
A more general approach (Gill and Robins, 2001; Lok et al., 2004; Robins, 1987,
1989; Robins, Herna´n and Brumback, 2000) within the potential response frame-
work replaces Conditions 10.2 and 10.3 with the following variants:
Condition 10.4 If Ao,N = g(Lo,N ), then Yo = Ye.
That is, if in the observational regime we happen to observe a complete
history that could have arisen under the operation of e, then the response will
be identical to what we would have observed had we been operating e.
Condition 10.5
Ao,i⊥⊥ Ye | (Lo,i = li, Ao,i−1 = g(li−1)) (i = 1, . . . , N).
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That is, if, in the observational strategy, we happen to observe a partial his-
tory that could have arisen under the operation of e, then the next action is
independent of the potential response under e.
Condition 10.4 implies, and can in fact be replaced by:
Condition 10.6 Given (Lo,N = lN , Ao,N = g(lN )), Yo and Ye have the same
conditional distribution.
The deterministic strategy e is termed evaluable if, for each i:
Condition 10.7
p
(
Lo,i = li, Ao,i−1 = g(li−1)
)
> 0⇒ p
(
Lo,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)
)
> 0.
Note that Conditions 10.4–10.7 make no mention of potential intermediate
variables (Le,N , Ae,N ) under e — though they do involve both versions, Yo and
Ye, of the response. The relevant variables in the problem can thus be taken as
(Lo,N , Ao,N , Yo, Ye), having a joint distribution p say.
Conditions 10.5 and 10.6 are weaker than those of § 10.1 as none of the
variables under strategy e other than Ye are involved. Note that, for example,
it is not required that, when an observational partial history could have arisen
under e, that is the history that would have so arisen; but even so, constraints
on Ye are then imposed.
10.2.1. Connexions
It is straightforward to show directly that, when Conditions 10.5, 10.6 and
10.7 hold, the marginal distribution of Ye, or the interventional consequence
E{k(Ye)}, can be identified by the G-recursion (12). We now show how this
approach can be related to our own decision-theoretic one. Specifically, we shall
show that, when the above conditions hold, so do those of § 8.1 (see also Theorem
3.2 of Robins (1997)).
Condition 10.7 is just Condition 8.1 specialized to the case of the determin-
istic strategy e.
To continue, we construct a fictitious distribution pi(·) (i = 0, . . . , N), for
variables (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ), as follows.
Definition 10.1 The distribution pi of (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) is defined as
the distribution under p of (Lo,1, Ao,1, . . . , Lo,i, Ao,i, Lo,i+1, g(Lo,i+1), . . . , Lo,N , g(Lo,N), Ye).
Thus
pi(LN = lN , AN = aN , Y = y) :={
p(Lo,N = lN , Ao,i = ai, Ye = y) if ai+1 = g(li+1), . . . , aN = g(lN )
0 otherwise.
(56)
Note that this construction of pi is quite different from that developed, in a
different context, in § 8.2. In particular, the marginal joint distribution of (LN )
is, for every pi, the same as under po.
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Equation (35) follows trivially from Definition 10.1.
As in § 8.2, Properties (36), and (38) for i ≤ N , hold because the joint
distribution of all variables up to and including Li is the same under pi−1 as
under p( · ; o); while for (38) with i = N + 1, when LN+1 ≡ Y , we also use
Condition 10.6.
Equation (39) holds since the distribution on either side is concentrated on
g(li).
Finally we show (40).
We only need this for (li, ai) ∈ Γi−1. Since then (li, ai) ∈ Γ, we must by
(33) have p(aj | lj , aj−1 ; e) > 0 (1 ≤ j ≤ i), which in virtue of the determin-
istic nature of strategy e requires ai = g(li); and then the additional condition
(li, ai) ∈ O becomes p(Lo,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)) > 0. So in this case (40) becomes:
p(Ye = y | Lo,i = li, Ao,i−1 = g(li−1)) = p(Ye = y | Lo,i = li, Ao,i = g(li)).
(57)
But this is an immediate consequence of Condition 10.5.
In summary, we have shown:
Theorem 10.3 Under Conditions 10.1, 10.6 and 10.5, and defining pi(·) by
Definition 10.1, Conditions 5.2 and 8.1 and equations (35)–(40) are all satisfied.
From Lemma 8.1 we now deduce:
Corollary 10.4 Under Conditions 10.5–10.7, the consequence of strategy e can
be recovered using the G-recursion (12).
11. Discussion
11.1. What has been achieved?
In this work we have described and developed a fully decision-theoretic ap-
proach to the problem of dynamic treatment assignment. The central issue
identified and addressed is the transfer of probabilistic information between
differing regimes. When justified, this can allow future policy analysis to take
appropriate account of previously gathered data.
Out of this approach we have developed an alternative derivation and inter-
pretation of Robins’s G-computation algorithm, relating it to the fundamental
‘backward induction’ recursion algorithm of dynamic programming. Moreover
we have shown that this is applicable more generally, including to problems
involving randomized treatment decisions.
We have devoted some attention to the question of how one might justify the
simple stability property (6), or the more general conditions of Lemma 8.1. One
can attempt this by including unobservable variables into one’s reasoning, and
using influence diagram to check the desired properties by simple graphical ma-
nipulations. However, as discussed in § 7.2.2, the graphical approach sometimes
imposes more restrictions than necessary, and an algebraic approach based on
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manipulations of conditional independence properties can be more general and
powerful.
We have also broadened the application of the graphical approach of Pearl and Robins
(1995) to allow assessment of the effects of conditional interventions, that are
allowed to depend on the values of other variables in the problem. This is a
particularly natural requirement when we contemplate sequential interventions,
where it is clearly desirable to be able to respond appropriately to the informa-
tion obtained to date, and so naturally to consider dynamic strategies. We have
noted that the graphical expression of condition (6) for simple stability is equiva-
lent to sequential application of Pearl’s back-door criterion, and that this allows
identification by G-recursion of the consequences of conditional interventions,
not only for the ultimate response Y but also for every intermediate covariate
Li. We have further noted that our graphical check for the more general case of
§ 8 is equivalent to that suggested by Robins (1997).
11.2. Syntax and semantics
An important pragmatic aspect of our approach is that, in order to apply it
sensibly, we have to be very clear about the real-world meaning of all the vari-
ables (whether ‘random’ or ‘decision’) appearing in our formulae. Thus, when
considering some interventional regime, we need to understand exactly what
real-world interventions are involved: we can not assume that setting a variable
to a specific value in different ways, or in different contexts, will have the same
overall effects on the system studied — see Herna´n and Taubman (2008) for a
discussion of these issues in the context of a specific application. Whenever we
consider arguments in favour of or against accepting a condition such as sta-
bility or extended stability, we must do so in full appreciation of the applied
context and circumstances — there can be no purely formal way of addressing
such issues.
This emphasis on the semantics of our representations contrasts with that
of other popular approaches, such as causal interpretation of DAGs or the do-
calculus (Pearl, 2009), which appear to operate purely syntactically. However
that is an illusion, since those interpretations and manipulations are always
grounded in an already assumed formal representation of the problem (e.g. as
a DAG, or a set of structural equations). So until we have satisfied ourselves
that this representation truly does capture our understanding of the real-world
behaviour of our problem — in particular, that it correctly describes the effects
of the interventions we care about — there can be no reason to have any faith
in the results of any formal manipulations on it.
11.3. Statistical inference
We have not directly addressed problems of statistical inference. One might
want to estimate the consequences of some proposed sequential strategy, or
test a null hypothesis that no strategy is effective in controlling the outcome.
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In principle one can estimate the ingredients of the G-recursion formula, ei-
ther parametrically or non-parametrically, from the available data, and then
(assuming simple stability, or the more general conditions of Lemma 8.1) ap-
ply it to supply estimates or tests of the effects of strategies of interest. The
proposal by Arjas and Saarela (2010) can be regarded as a Bayesian version
of G-computation. However, as pointed out by Robins and Wasserman (1997),
na¨ıve use of parametric models for the required conditional distributions can
lead to a ‘null-paradox’, rendering it impossible to discover that different strate-
gies have the same consequences. Also, when continuous variables are included,
G-recursion can involve a large number of nested integrals and become compu-
tationally impossible to implement. Hence we find only a few instances where G-
computation has been used for practical data analysis (Robins, Greenland and Hu,
1999; Taubman et al., 2009). The problems in applying G-recursion are exacer-
bated by the need, in many practical applications, to choose a large set of covari-
ates L so as to justify the stability assumption. This makes the modelling task
more difficult and raises issues of robustness to misspecification. Such considera-
tions have motivated the introduction of marginal or nested ‘structural models’
(Robins, 1998; Robins, Herna´n and Brumback, 2000), as well as doubly-robust
methods (Kang and Schafer, 2007), avoiding the null–paradox. Note that while
G-recursion provides a likelihood-based approach to the estimation of the con-
sequence of a given strategy, these latter methods rely on estimating equations.
It should be straightforward to reinterpret these models and analyses within a
fully decision-theoretic framework, by appropriate modelling of the intervention
distributions p( · ; s).
11.4. Optimal dynamic treatment strategies
Our work is motivated in part by the desire to compare a variety of sequential
treatment strategies so as to identify the best one. Recall that our set of regimes
is given by S = {o} ∪ S∗, where o is the observational regime, and S∗ is the
set of interventional strategies that we want to compare. If we want to apply
G-recursion, justifying it by simple stability as in § 5.3 or by the more general
conditions of Lemma 8.1, we need to ensure that the respective conditions hold
for all strategies e ∈ S∗ that we want to compare. As we saw in § 8.3.2, this is
not trivial: if S∗ contains static as well as dynamic strategies, in some situations
the former may be identified while the latter are not. In fact it follows from
Dawid and Didelez (2008) that if want to find an optimal strategy among all
dynamic regimes, we will usually need the restrictive requirement of simple
stability to hold for all e ∈ S∗.
As mentioned in § 4, the standard dynamic programming routine for iden-
tifying an optimal strategy can be regarded as a combination of G-recursion
and stagewise optimisation. Under conditions allowing G-recursion, this can in
principle be put directly into effect, after estimating all the required distribu-
tional ingredients from the available data. In practice (as pointed out by Robins
(1986) and many others since), this quickly becomes infeasible, especially if one
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wants to avoid parametric restrictions. This is because the number of possible
histories for which the optimal next decision has to be determined at each stage
of the backward induction recursion can grow extremely rapidly with increasing
number N of time points and levels of (li, ai−1).
Alternative approaches to the optimisation problem to sidestep this compu-
tational complexity have been suggested. Murphy (2003) introduces a method
based on regret functions (see the discussion and application in Rosthøj et al.
(2006)), which is closely related to the structural nested models of Robins (2004)
(see Moodie, Richardson and Stephens (2007) for a comparison of these two ap-
proaches). Henderson, Ansel and Alshibani (2010) modify Murphy’s approach
so as to be amenable to standard statistical model checking procedures. How-
ever, all these alternative methods for finding optimal dynamic treatments rely
on the same identification conditions underlying G-computation, as well as on
various additional (semi-)parametric assumptions.
11.5. Complete identifiability
Simple stability, or the alternative conditions of Lemma 8.1, are sufficient con-
ditions allowing the use of G-recursion, and thereby identification of the conse-
quences of a given strategy. In recent years the Artificial Intelligence community
has devoted some effort to finding necessary as well as sufficient conditions for
the identifiability of consequences of interventions (Huang and Valtorta, 2006;
Shpitser and Pearl, 2006a,b). These results rely heavily on the assumptions en-
coded in causal DAGs or semi-Markovian causal models. Even within this more
restricted framework, the general question of identifiability of dynamic treat-
ment strategies seems still to be an open problem (but see Tian (2008)).
11.6. Other problems
Many problems in causal inference, previously tackled using potential response
or causal DAG formulations, gain in clarity, simplicity and generality when
reformulated as problems of decision analysis. Specific topics that have been
fruitfully treated in this way include: confounding (Dawid, 2002); partial com-
pliance (Dawid, 2003); direct and indirect effects (Didelez, Dawid and Geneletti,
2006; Geneletti, 2007); identification of the effect of treatment on the treated
(Geneletti and Dawid, 2010); Mendelian randomization (Didelez and Sheehan,
2007); Granger causality (Eichler and Didelez, 2010); and causal inference un-
der outcome-dependent sampling (Didelez, Kreiner and Keiding, 2010). How-
ever there still remains a wide range of other issues in ‘causal inference’ that we
believe would benefit from the application of the decision-theoretic viewpoint.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Two lemmas on DAG-separation
Here we prove generalised versions of equations (8) and (9) (Lemma 1) of
Pearl and Robins (1995).
Let D be a DAG.
Lemma A.1
Y ⊥⊥DX | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥DX | Z∗ (58)
whenever Z ⊆ Z∗ ⊆ an(X ∪ Y ∪ Z).
Proof. Let G := man(X ∪ Y ∪ Z); then also G = man(X ∪ Y ∪ Z∗). The
left-hand side of (58) says that any path from Y to X in G intersects Z, whence
it must also intersect the larger set Z∗. ✷
Lemma A.2
Y ⊥⊥DX | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥DX | Z
∗ (59)
whenever Z∗ = Z ∩ A for A an ancestral set in D containing X ∪ Y .
Proof. We first note that (X ∪ Y ) ∪ Z∗ is a subset of A, since both its terms
are. Since A is ancestral, it follows that
an(X ∪ Y ∪ Z∗) ⊆ A. (60)
Define G as above, and G′ := man(X ∪ Y ∪Z∗). Then both the node-set and
edge-set for G′ are subsets of the corresponding sets for G, and hence the same
property holds for the path-set. Suppose the right-hand side of (59) fails. Then
there exists a path pi in G′ connecting Y and X and avoiding Z∗; then pi is a
path in G with the same property. Since pi ⊆ G′, if it intersects Z anywhere it
can only do so at a point of an(X ∪ Y ∪Z∗) — and thus, by (60), at a point in
A, and hence in Z∗. Since this has been excluded, the result follows. ✷
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